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Abstract
Tolerance implies enduring trying circumstances with a fair and objective attitude. To determine
whether evolutionary advantagesmight be stemming fromdiverse levels of tolerance in a population,
we study a spatial public goods game, where in addition to cooperators, defectors, and loners, tolerant
players are also present. Depending on the number of defectors within a group, a tolerant player can
either cooperate in or abstain from a particular instance of the game.We show that the diversity of
tolerance can give rise to synergistic effects, wherein players with a different threshold in terms of the
tolerated number of defectors in a group competemost effectively against defection and default
abstinence. Such synergistic associations can stabilise states of full cooperationwhere otherwise
defectionwould dominate.We observe complex pattern formation that gives rise to an intricate phase
diagram,where invisible yet stable strategy alliances require outmost care lest they are overlooked.
Our results highlight the delicate importance of diversity and tolerance for the provisioning of public
goods, and they reveal fascinating subtleties of the spatiotemporal dynamics that is due to the
competition of subsystem solutions in structured populations.
1. Introduction
The stability ofmodern human societies relies on public goods that future generations have, in recent decades,
increasingly taken for granted [1]. This is likely to have dire consequences becausewe fail to grasp the long-term
consequences of unsustainable exploitation of natural resources and the unchecked growth of consumerism as
the dominating social and economic order [2]. Tolerance, as the ability or willingness to steadfastly endure
something, and in particular, a trying circumstance such as the existence of opinions or behaviour that one does
not necessarily agreewith,might be an important part of the equation to take us back on track. Although,
according toDarwin’sTheOrigin of Species, natural selection favours theﬁttest and themost successful
individuals, which in turn implies an innate selﬁshness that greatly challenges the concept of cooperation,
tolerance and social norms in human societiesmay just be themissing ingredient for cooperative behaviour to
prevail [3–12]. In the realmof these considerations, evolutionary game theorywaits ready as the theoretical
foundation that isﬁt for addressing such challenges in a concise and relevantmanner [13–17]. The public goods
game [18], in particular, has been established for addressing situations that, if left unattended,may evolve
towards the tragedy of the commons [19].
The crux of the underlying social dilemma lies in the fact that cooperation foresees an altruistic act that is
costly to performbut beneﬁts another. Althoughmutual cooperationwould be optimal for all involved, a higher
payoff, at least in the short term, is possible by exploiting the cooperative efforts of others. An often explored
remedy is to punish defectors who do not contribute to the public good [20–28], or to reward cooperators who
do contribute to the public good [29–36]. However, the problemwith both actions is that they are costly.
Punishment entails bearing a cost for somebody else to incur a cost, while rewarding entails bearing a cost for
somebody else to incur a beneﬁt. As such, the basic dilemma is simply transferred to another level, hence the
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term second-order free-riding [37, 38], which describes all thosewho beneﬁt from either reward or punishment
but do not contribute towards covering the related costs. Another option is to simply abstain from the game if
the outlook is not sufﬁciently rosy, and to settle for a small, but secure payoff instead [39, 40]. Previous research
has shown, however, that defectors, cooperators, and loners become entailed in a closed loop of dominance [41–
47], whichmaintains a RedQueen existence of cooperative behaviour that on average is no better than if
everybodywould abstain [48, 49].
Here we consider diverse levels of tolerance in the public goods game as an alternative to the aforementioned
strategies. Indeed, instead of simply abandoning a less prospective public goods enterprise by abstaining, itmay
makemuchmore sense to tolerate the situation and to endure against an emerging negative trend. Thus, in
addition to cooperators, defectors, and loners, we also consider tolerant players. They are thosewhomonitor the
strategies of their neighbors and behave accordingly. In particular, if the number of defectors in the group
exceeds a certain threshold tolerant players behave as loners, while otherwise they cooperate. Such behavior is
similar in spirit to conditional cooperation [50–53], but in the present case we do not neglect the fact that
monitoring others to know the actual number of defectors in the group requires an additional effort, and thus
comeswith an additional cost of inspection. Importantly, instead of the application of a single level of tolerance
[54], the question is whether diverse tolerance strategies offer evolutionary advantages over default abstinence,
andwhether there is synergy or competition among them?Aswewill show, advantages to tolerance and
synergies do exist, such that players with a different threshold in terms of the tolerated number of defectors in a
group provide an optimal response to the public goods dilemma. These solutions aremade possible by the
spontaneous emergence of complex spatial patterns that require a sufﬁciently large system size to emerge from
random initial conditions. In fact, wewill show that some globally stable subsystem solutions remain completely
invisible even at a large system size, which is a strikingmanifestation of the subtleties that self-organising
processes in a complex systemmay evoke. Before presenting these results inmore detail, however, weﬁrst
proceedwith the description of the public goods gamewith diverse levels of tolerance.
2. Public goods gamewith diverse tolerance levels
The public goods game is staged on a square lattice with periodic boundary conditions where L2 players are
arranged into overlapping groups of sizeG=5 such that everyone is connected to its -G 1nearest neighbours.
Accordingly, each individual belongs to g=1,K,G different groups. The square lattice is the simplest of
networks that allows us to go beyond thewell-mixed population assumption, and as such it allows us to take into
account the fact that the interactions among players that are engaged in group interactions are often inherently
structured rather than random [18]. Nevertheless, for comparison and to provide some primer intuition about
the competition of tolerant strategies, we also present results obtained in awell-mixed population, where groups
are formed randomly.
Initially each player on site x is designated either as a defector ( =s Dx ), a cooperator ( =s Cx ), a loner
( =s Lx ), or a tolerant player (sx=Mi). Evidently, there are asmany levels of tolerance as there are possible
defectors in the group, so that = ¼ -i G0, , 1. If the number of defectors in a group is smaller than i the player
Mi acts as a cooperator, while otherwise it acts as a loner. As such, the value of i determines the level of tolerance a
particularMi player has. The higher the value of i, the higher the number of defectors that are tolerated by anMi
player within a groupwithout it refusing cooperation. As the two extreme cases, i=0 indicates that anMi player
will always remain in the non-participatory loner state, while = -i G 1 indicates that anMi player will switch
to a loner state only if all the other neighbors are defectors. Importantly, regardless of the choice anMi player
makes, it always bears the cost γ as a compensation for knowing the number of defectors in a group.
As is standard practice, all cooperative strategies contribute a ﬁxed amount c, here considered c=1without
loss of generality, to the public goodwhile defectors and loners contribute nothing. The sumof all contributions
in each group ismultiplied by the synergy factor r and the resulting public goods are distributed equally amongst
all the groupmembers that are not loners. Importantly, the >r 1 factor is applied only if there are at least two
contributionsmade to the commonpool fromwithin the group.Otherwise, a lonely contributor is unable to
utilize on the synergistic effect of a group effort, and hence r=1 applies. It is also an accepted protocol that
loners, who do not participate in the game, obtain amoderate but secure payoffσ. By following previous related
research [39, 48], we use s = 1but emphasize that using other values does not change ourmainﬁndings as long
as the rank of payoff values remains unchanged.
Aswe have argued, the behavior of tolerant players depends sensitively on the number of defectors within a
group, whichwe denote as nD. Diverse tolerance thresholds can be introduced by using different di prefactors,
which are d = 0i if n iD and d = 1i if <n iD . Hence, the total number of contributors to the commonpool is
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MonteCarlo simulations of the public goods game are carried out comprising the following elementary
steps. A randomly selected player x plays the public goods gamewith its -G 1partners as amember of all the
g=1,K,G groups, whereby its overall payoffPsx is thus the sumof all the payoffs Psx acquired in each
individual group.Next, player x chooses one of its nearest neighbours at random, and the chosen co-player y also
acquires its payoffPsy in the sameway. Finally, player y adopts the strategy fromplayer xwith a probability given
by the Fermi function
( ) { [( ) ]} ( ) = + P - Pw s s K1 1 exp , 6x y s sy x
whereK=0.5 quantiﬁes the uncertainty by strategy adoptions [55–57], implying that better performing players
are readily adopted, although it is not impossible to adopt the strategy of a player performingworse. Each full
Monte Carlo step (MCS) gives a chance to every player to change its strategy once on average. Further regarding
the applied strategy update dynamics, we emphasize that only imitation is allowed butmutation is not
considered. If wewould apply a permanentmutation rate ν, then all competing strategies would be present in the
system. In particular, the smallest fraction of a strategy would be at least proportional to themutation rate ν.
Under such circumstances, we can no longer speak about transitions between different solutions, and this
effectivelymakes the presentation of phase diagramsmeaningless. One couldmeasure the stationary frequency
of every strategy in the presence ofmutation, but this is beyond the scope of the present work.
In case of well-mixed populations, we have used =N 107 players, while the system size for the square lattice
topologywas varied from ´ = ´L L 100 100 to 6000× 6000. Aswewill discuss in detail later, the appropriately
chosen system size is essential to get reliable results that are valid in the large size limit. As expected, the
relaxation time depends sensitively on both the system size and the proximity to the phase transition points,
which is why it was varied from103 to 106MCSs.We note that the random initial statemay not necessarily yield a
relaxation to themost stable solution of the game even at such a large system size (L= 6000). To verify the
stability of different subsystem solutions, we have therefore conducted an appropriate stability analysis that
involves the usage of prepared initial states, as illustrated inﬁgure 2. In the next section, we present themain
results.
3. Results
Before presenting themain results obtained in structured populations, weﬁrst present results obtained inwell-
mixed populations, where players do not haveﬁxed neighbours but rather formgroups randomly. Due to the
large number of independent variables analytical solutions are unattainable, butwe can perform individual-
based simulations to explore different outcomes of the evolutionary process. It is a well-known fact that the
behaviour of awell-mixed systemmay depend sensitively on the initial conditions.We therefore restrict ourself
to the case when all competing strategies are initially present in equal proportions.Moreover, to further simplify
the calculation, we applied deterministic strategy updating in this case, such that a player adopts the strategy of a
randomly chosen partner only if the latter achieved a higher payoff. Despite of these simpliﬁcations, the outcome
of evolution still remains ambiguous in awell-mixed population.More precisely, there are parameter values
where theﬁnal outcome is different despite the fact that we have used exactly the same parameters and initial
conditions, and only different seeds for the randomnumber generator (the latter provides an inseparable source
of noise that inﬂuences the outcome of the evolution).While this behaviour ismore pronounced in smaller
populations, we could still observe it evenwhen using the largest available system size ( =N 107 players).
Consequently, it is impossible to present a rigorously valid phase diagram that depicts the outcome of the system
unambiguously at speciﬁc parameter values. Nevertheless, the analysis does provide an intuition about the
competition of the strategies at different parameter values.More precisely, the upper panel ofﬁgure 1 depicts the
most commonly selected stable solutions, as obtained for a given combination of the synergy factor r and the cost
of inspection γ. This statistically valid diagramwas obtained by using =N 107 players and independently
repeating the evolution 100 times for every point of the parameter plane. The presented results indicate that the
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competition amongMi strategies will always select a sole winner that can coexist with unconditionalC andD
players. Also, it can be observed that the lower the synergy factor r, the lower the threshold from thewinning
tolerant strategy. These results thus suggest that, under harsh conditions, tolerant players do not have the luxury
of tolerating toomany defectors in the group because the small value of r simply cannot compensate their lack of
contributions to the public good. The reverse is also true, namely that at larger values of r theMi strategy with a
higher threshold outperforms the less tolerant strategies. In the extreme case, when γ is also high, then all
conditionally tolerant strategies extinct and unconditionally cooperators coexist with defectors due to thewell-
known consequence of network reciprocity: ifC playersmanage to form compact clusters then their resulting
payoff could be high enough to compensate the presence of defectors at the border of such domains. In this way
we can observe a patternwhere cooperator domains are separated by defector players where their time-
independent fractions depends sensitively on the value of r.
Aswas frequently observed for various other evolutionary games before [46, 56, 58, 59], going fromwell-
mixed to structured populations signiﬁcantly affects the results, and the presently consideredmodel is in this
regard no different. Importantly, the outcome of the evolutionary process in a structured population is always
unambiguous if only the system size is large enough. In otherwords, if a solution that emerges somewhere in the
population is capable to dominate other solutions, it will gradually spread and prevail in thewhole system. In
this way, the originalmeaning of the phase diagram is restored, as it informs us about the stable solutions that are
obtained in dependence on themain systemparameters. For the square lattice, such a phase diagram is shown in
the bottompanel ofﬁgure 1. The presented results reveal several fundamental features that can be associated
with the viability of tolerant strategies in the public goods game. In agreementwith the preceding results
Figure 1. Full phase diagramof the 8-strategymodel on the g-r parameter plane, as obtained for awell-mixed (upper panel) and
structured population (lower panel). Dashed lines denote discontinuous, while solid linesmark continuous phase transitions. In the
well-mixed population a single tolerant strategy is always selected during the evolution, while in the structured population there also
exist regions where the coexistence of different tolerance levels is the stable solution. In the latter case the grey-shaded region in the
two-strategyDM2 phase denotes those parameter values where the population evolves into a full-cooperator, defector-free M M1 2
phase, but only if the system size is large enough.We attend to these invisible solutions in detail inﬁgure 7.
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obtained inwell-mixed populations, it can be observed that the higher the value of r, the higher the tolerance can
be, and vice versa. This observation resonates with our naive expectation and perception of tolerance in that
overly tolerant strategies cannot survive in the presence of other less tolerant strategies. From the viewpoint of
the considered evolutionary game this is not surprising, because players adopting theM4 strategy act as loners
only if everybody else in the group is a defector. And such sheer unlimited tolerance is simply not competitive
with other less tolerant strategies. Also, if the cost of inspection is too high, or if the value of the synergy factor is
either very lowor very high, then tolerant players cannot survive even if they exhibit different levels of tolerance.
This observation is in agreement with preceding research on the subject, where only uniform tolerance levels
were considered [54].
More precisely, as the lower panel ofﬁgure 1 reveals, at very low values of r, similarly as in the simplest three-
strategyDCLmodel, the loners prevail. At slightly larger values of r, this single-strategy phase gives way to the
three-strategy phase where D C, , and L strategies dominate each other cyclically. Interestingly, unlike in the
uniform tolerance public goods game [54], here the   D C L D closed loop of dominance is the only
way for loners to survive at higher r values [39]. In all the other cases the loners die out due to the fact that the
diversity of tolerant players is able to provide amore competitive response to the exploitation of defectors.
Indeed, if we increase the synergy factor further, weﬁnd that, through a succession of different phase transitions,
theDCLphase gives way to a rich variety of two-, three- or even four-strategy phases, in all of which tolerant
strategies are present. These solutions are theDCM1, theDM2, theDCM2, and theDCM3 phase, as well as two
four-strategy phases DCM M1 2 and DCM M2 3, which are unique to the public goods gamewith diverse strategy
levels.We emphasize that the coexistence of tolerant strategies with different tolerance levels is due entirely to
the consideration of structured populations.We remind that such evolutionary outcomes are impossible in
well-mixed populations, as evidence by the results presented in the upper panel ofﬁgure 1.
According to the phase diagram in the bottompanel ofﬁgure 1, theﬁrst transition from theDCL phase to
one of thementioned phases is always discontinuous. The accurate position of these kind of phase transition
points, as denoted by the dashed line in the phase diagram, can only be determined bymeans of a stability
analysis of competing subsystem solutions. A subsystem solution can be formed by any subset of all the
competing strategies, and on their own (if separated fromother strategies) these subsystems solutions are stable.
This is trivially true if the subsystem solution is formed by a single strategy, but is likewise true ifmore than one
strategy forms such a solution. Evidently then, for any speciﬁc set of parameter values,more than one subsystem
solution exists. The dominant subsystem solution, and hence the phase that is ultimately depicted in the phase
diagram such as the one shown in the bottompanel ofﬁgure 1, can only be determined by letting all the
subsystem solutions compete against each other. As an example, we show in ﬁgure 2 the competition between
the three-strategyDCL phase and the four-strategy DCM M1 2 phase at both sides of the discontinuous phase
transition point, although on both sides the two phases are individually stable, i.e., are proper subsystem
solutions. Tomonitor the competition between the two subsystem solutions, we launch the evolution froma
prepared initial state, where one half of the lattice initially contains only strategies D C, , and L distributed
uniformly at random,while the other half of the lattice contains only the strategies D C M, , 1, andM2 distributed
uniformly at random.As the next step, we let the two subsystem solutions evolve to their representative state in
terms of the strategy frequencies and the typical spatial pattern.Onlywhen both reach their stationary state we
open the border by allowing strategy invasion through the separating interface. Lastly, wemonitor how the
competition between the two solutions evolves, i.e., which subsystem solutionwill turn out as the victor. The
example depicted inﬁgure 2 demonstrates clearly that the ﬁnal outcome depends sensitively on the value of the
synergy factor r. At the smaller value of r theDCL solutionwins, while at the slightly larger value of r the
DCM M1 2 solution turns out to be the dominant one.
We emphasize thatﬁnite-size effects can easily play an obstructive role in the processes illustrated inﬁgure 2.
If we start the evolution from a random initial state using a small system size, it can easily happen that we observe
amisleading evolutionary outcome, simply because the phase that would be a stable solution at large system size
has no chance to emerge—for example, one of the strategies that would be necessary to form it dies out
beforehand due to the small system size. But that is not the only caveat. Even if we use prepared initial states for
the stability analysis, we should be careful because the space (part of the lattice) allocated to each potential
subsystem solution should be large enough for the latter to emerge. For example, the ﬂuctuations of strategies in
the cyclically dominantDCL phase could be extremely large, and therefore this subsystem solution alone
requires a large population to avoidﬁxation before the characteristic stationary pattern emerges.We note that
the upper panels ofﬁgure 2 show just a small patch around the borderwhere the two solutionsmeet, which is cut
out of a large 2400× 2400 lattice (not shown). This is alsowhy the periodic boundary conditions cannot be
detected in the four depicted snapshots.
We proceedwith the exploration of themain phase diagramobtained on the square lattice, and to have a
more accurate insight with regards to the recorded solutions, we show inﬁgure 3 two representative cross
sections. The presented results reveal that there is a clear selection among the different tolerant strategies, and
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hence often only one of them survives and forms a stable solutionwith either theD or/and theC players. There
are, however, also speciﬁc parameter values where the stable solution contains two different tolerant strategies.
While an explanation for such a coexistence will be presented later, themessage is that, sometimes, diverse levels
of tolerance do provide an optimal response to the public goods dilemma.
Figure 2.An example of a proper stably analysis of two subsystem solutions, namely the three-strategyDCL and the four-strategy
DCM M1 2 phase, which are separated by a discontinuous phase transition in ﬁgure 1. The series of snapshots in the upper row shows
the separation of the lattice in two parts, each of which is initially randomly populatedwith the strategies that will formone of the two
competing subsystem solutions (panel (a)). In panel (b), the subsystem solutions are formed in both halves of the square lattice, and
accordingly, their competition can start by removing the border between them (thus allowing strategy transfer across the border).
Panel (c) shows an intermediate state during the competition inwhich theDCL phasewill ultimately turn out to be thewinner.Here
r=2.80 and g = 0.35. Panel (d), on the other hand, shows an intermediate state during the competition inwhich the DCM M1 2
phasewill ultimately turn out to be thewinner.Here r=2.81while the value of γ is unchanged. Importantly, for both values of r the
state depicted in panel (b) is qualitatively exactly the same (both phases are individually stable regardless of which value of r is used).
The two graphs in the bottom rowdepict the corresponding (r=2.80 left and r=2.81 right) time evolution of the strategy densities.
After a relaxation of 20000MCS (marked by an arrow), the two subsystem solutions start competing for space.On the left side the
DCL solutionwins, while on the right side the DCM M1 2 solutionwins. The linear system size used for this example was L=2400, but
the snapshots in the upper row contain just a 200×200 cutoff of thewhole population for clarity.
Figure 3.Two representative cross-sections of the phase diagramdepicted inﬁgure 1, left as obtained for g = 0.10 and right as
obtained for g = 0.35. In both cases there exist values of r at which different tolerant strategies can coexist, and in both cases the
population goes through a succession of continuous and discontinuous phase transitions. For g = 0.35 the four-strategy DCM M1 2
phase becomes unstable aswe increase r. The next phase is the two-strategyDM2 phase. Importantly, however, this phase can only be
reached if the system size is relatively small (see ﬁgure 7 for details). If the system size is sufﬁciently large, then the evolution terminates
into a full-cooperator, defector-free M M1 2 phase, which ismarked by the grey-shaded interval. The error bars in both plots are
comparable to thewidth of the lines.
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Amore accurate comparison of the two plots inﬁgure 3 reveals qualitatively different behaviour.When the
cost γ is low (left), we can observe continuous transitions between the phases. Starting from theDCM1 phase, we
ﬁrst see that the fraction of theM2 players increases gradually while the fraction of theM1 players decreases.
Similarly, whenwe leave theDCM2 phase, the fraction of theM3 players in the population growswhile the
fraction of theM2 players decreases. Finally, when the synergy factor provides a sufﬁciently comfortable
environment for pure cooperators, the last tolerant strategy (M3) dies out, givingway to theDC phase.
Intuitively, onemight expect that a higher inspection cost wouldmake the tolerant strategiesmore vulnerable.
Yet this is true only for very high γ values. The left panel ofﬁgure 3 illustrates that the four-strategy DCM M1 2
phase terminates qualitatively differently from theway it does for the low γ value. In the high-γ case the time
average of the fraction of each strategies is well above zero, but the four-strategy phase becomes unstable aswe
increase r due to invincible ﬂuctuations of strategy frequencies.
This behaviour is illustrated inﬁgure 4, wherewe showhow the fraction of cooperators varies over time for
different values of r at two different values of γ. To emphasise the remarkably different behaviour, we have used a
notably large system size, L=4800, where normally the ﬂuctuations of strategy densities should be virtually
invisible. This expectation is conﬁrmed in the left panel when the system leaves the four-strategy DCM M1 2 phase
via a continuous phase transition. But in the right panel, when a higher cost γ is applied, the ﬂuctuations in
amplitude are increasing drastically as we increase the value of r and approach the discontinuous phase
transition point.
In this ‘unstable’ parameter region theﬁnal solution depends sensitively onwhich strategy dies outﬁrst.
According to our observations, strategies M0, M3, M4, and L die out very soon, and the fundamental question
remainswhether the M1 strategy or the C strategywill die out next, because this ultimately dictates two very
different solutions. If the M1 strategy dies outﬁrst, we return to the previously studied uniform-tolerance public
goods game [54], where the system terminates into the two-strategy DM2 phase. Indeed, this scenario
materialises almost always if the system size is small. If the system size is large, however, the C strategy dies out
ﬁrst, which allows the two tolerant strategies to form the stable two-strategy M M1 2 phase. In this case the
presence of diverse tolerance levels thus ensures that defectors arewiped out completely, leaving the population
in defector-free, full-cooperator state.
To illustrate how the combination of different tolerant strategies is themost effective response to a public
goods dilemma, we present a series of snapshots that is carefully engineered to illustrate exactly what otherwise
remains invisible if a small population starts from a random initial state. In the panel(a) ofﬁgure 5, we start
exactly like that—with a small 200´200 lattice where initially all eight strategies are distributed uniformly at
random.After a relatively short relaxation time only D Mand 2 players survive in panel, (b) to formwhat appears
to be the dominating two-strategy phase at these parameter values. In fact, this DM2 phase is the dominant stable
solution in the previously studied uniform-tolerance public goods game [54]. But in the game studied here, we
have other options because of the diverse tolerance levels that we consider. Therefore, to test the stability of the
DM2 phase properly, we insert small compact patches of other strategies in panel (c). These are the pure
cooperators (C), the loners (L), and the tolerant strategy (M1), positioned from the left-upper part of the lattice
Figure 4.The time course of the fraction of cooperators in the stationary state, as obtained for different values of the synergy factor r
(see legend) at g = 0.05 (left) and at g = 0.35 (right). For all the cases we have used a large 4800×4800 lattice, which ought to result
in smooth lines in all the cases, as indeed it does in the left panel, and for some values of r in the right panel. However, as we approach
the phase transition point with larger values of r, it can be observed that the amplitude of the ﬂuctuations in the right panel increases
signiﬁcantly.Most interestingly, these ﬂuctuations are not because the average fraction of cooperators would go to zero aswe increase
r. In fact, the right panel ofﬁgure 3 illustrates the opposite, which is that rC slightly increases as we approach the critical point. The
comparison thus indicates that the four-strategy DCM M1 2 phase becomes inherently unstable aswe increase r at g = 0.35. For clarity,
the upper three curves in the right panel are shifted vertically by a constant value.
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in a clockwisemanner. Subsequently, panels(d) and (e) demonstrate clearly thatﬁrst the loners die out,
followed by the pure cooperators. However, the M1 strategy forms a powerful alliancewith the M2 strategy,
whose domain is able to grow, as shown in panel (e). Gradually, all the defectors are crowded out, and in the ﬁnal
state illustrated in panel(f), only the two different tolerant strategies remain to provide themaximal cooperation
level in the defector-free state. Thus, it turns out that the M M1 2 subsystem solution is ultimately stronger than
the DM2 subsystem solution. This outcome can be interpreted so that M2 players are efﬁcient at sweeping out
C Land players, who, as the two extreme limits of tolerance, prevent other M strategies to function efﬁciently.
At the same time, M1players are capable to beat strategy D. Accordingly, we need the features of both
M Mand1 2 players to reach the happy end.
The optional participation in the public goods game can easily result in a smaller effective group size because
not only L but also Mi playersmay refuse participation in the joint venture. This raises the possibility that the
ﬁxed value of the synergy factor r becomes larger than the effective group size ¢G , whichwould transform the
public goods dilemma to a gamewhere players would actually have an incentive to prefer cooperation over
defection. To clarify this, we have calculated the average size of every groupwhere the public goods gamewas
played, alongwith the value of the synergy factor r that was used to determine the payoffs. The obtained results
are presented inﬁgure 6, wherewe show the average value of ¢G in dependence on the synergy factor r , as
obtained for three representative values of the cost. Here g = 0.1, 0.5 and 0.9 represent low, intermediate and
high cost values of tolerant players, respectively. As the results show, ¢G is always well-above the corresponding
value of r , thus leaving the public goods dilemma intact, even if effective group size ¢G changes. This quantity,
however, helps us to gain a deeper understanding of why the above-discussed DM2 coexistence can provide a
competitive solution against C L, or other Mi strategies. As themiddle curve inﬁgure 6 shows, the value of ¢G
jumps up and approaches themaximal =G 5 level at an intermediate value of r , wherewe have observed the
stable DM2 phase. At this point we note again that ¢G ismeasured only for those groupswhere the public goods
game is actually played. Accordingly, the high value of ¢G indicates that M2 players contribute to the common
pool almost exclusively when players of the same type are present dominantly in the group. In this case they can
cba
d e f
Figure 5. Finite-size effectsmay lead tomisleading outcomes of the strategy competition. At the beginning, we start the evolution from
a random initial state where all the eight strategies are present (panel (a)). After the relaxation of 1000MCS (panel (b)), onlyD (red)
andM2 (ochre) strategies survive, which also form the stable two-strategy phase in the uniform-tolerance public goods game at the
same parameter values (r=2.97 and g = 0.35). In panel(c), we thenmanually re-introduce small compact patches of three other
strategies, namely strategyC (blue), strategy L loner (green), and strategyM1 (yellow). Soon afterwards, loners die out (again) very soon
within theDM2 phase, as shown in panel(d). Later,C players also die out, but tolerant strategiesM1 andM2 form a successful alliance,
as shown in panel(e). Indeed, the M M1 2 subsystem solution turns out to be stronger than the previously declared victoriousDM2
phase, and the population terminates in a defector-free state, as shown in panel(f). The system size used in this example is L=200,
while stages presented in panels(d), (e), and (f)were obtained after 30, 250, and 1300 MCS s frompanel (c) onwards. Importantly, as
we demonstrate inﬁgure 7, the defector-free state can evolve naturally from a random initial state if the system size is large enough.
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collect the highestmutual payoff, otherwise, when they formgroupswith D players, they refuse to participate
and prefer a safer s payoff that is warranted by the loner strategy. In the latter case the public goods game does
not take place, and hence the average value of ¢G is not lowered. Although it is possible to claim that other Mi
strategies behave similarly, the intermediate tolerance threshold level applied by the M2 strategy is the best
compromise under this conditions to reach themost competitive payoff.
Turning back to the properties of the phase diagramdepicted in the bottompanel of ﬁgure 1, the example
shown inﬁgure 5 highlights that the order inwhich the strategies die out is crucial for the ﬁnal evolutionary
outcome. To give amore quantitatively accurate prediction of whether the systemwill terminate into the DM2 or
the M M1 2 phase, we show inﬁgure 7 theﬁxation probability to the latter for different combinations of gr and .
Here, we have always started the evolution from a random initial state (containing all the eight strategies
distributed uniformly at random), andwe have simply counted howmany times the system terminates into the
M M1 2 phase. The alternative destination of the evolutionary process was to arrive to the DM2 phase, which for all
the considered parameter combinations used inﬁgure 7 is the only other stable subsystem solution. To get a
reliable statistics, we have repeated these runs 1000 times for –=L 100 1000 linear system sizes, while for even
larger lattices we have averaged over 500 independent runs. The results depicted inﬁgure 7 show a remarkable
ﬁnite-size effect.More precisely, there are parameter values of gr and where the strategy C dies outﬁrst, thus
allowing the M M1 2 phase to conquer thewhole system. But this solution remains completely invisible if the
system size is too small. And these are the speciﬁc combinations of the parameters gr and that are shaded grey
Figure 6.The effective size of groups ¢G when the public goods game is played in dependence on the synergy factor r , as obtained for
different values of the cost g (see legend). The presented results demonstrate that the value of ¢G always exceeds the actual value of the
synergy factor r , thus always preserving the original public goods dilemma even though the participation is not obligatory. The curve
obtained for g = ¢ =G0.5 reaches 5 at an intermediate value of r , thereby indirectly revealingwhy the M2 strategy is particularly
effective in the presence of defectors. Namely, players adopting the M2 strategy contribute to the commonpool almost exclusively
when akin M2 players are also in the group, while otherwise they refuse participation and act as loners.
Figure 7.The invisible solutions. Fixation probability for the M M1 2 phase, as obtained for g = 0.35 (left) and for =r 3.0 (right) in
dependence on the other key parameter, respectively. The linear size of the applied square lattices are indicated in the legend.
Remarkably, there exist combinations of parameters gr and at which, even at 500´ 500 system size, the M M1 2 solutions remains
completely invisible, even though at amuch larger 6000´ 6000 system size theﬁxation probability for the exact same solution is 1.
Depicted probabilities are averaged over 500–1000 independent runs. Lines are just to guide the eye.
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in the phase diagram shown inﬁgure 1—these are the invisible solutions for the largemajority of the system sizes
that are inwidespread use in the literature nowadays.
4.Discussion
Summarising, we have studied the evolution of cooperation in a spatial public goods game entailing traditional
cooperators, defectors, and loners, as well as ﬁve different types of tolerant players. Our research has conﬁrmed
the naïve expectation thatminimal tolerance levels are best applied under adverse conditions for cooperation,
while higher tolerance levels are preferred under conditions favourable to cooperation.More importantly, we
have shown that the diversity of tolerance can give rise to synergistic effects, such that only players with a
different threshold provide the optimal response to defection and default abstinence, and in fact become
dominant where otherwise, in the absence of tolerance, cooperationwould not be viable. The results also reveal,
however, thatmore commonly the evolution selects a single tolerance level to coexist with one ormore of the
three traditional strategies. This highlights the subtle balance between punishment and reward thatmust bemet
for tolerance to have the desired effect. Namely, when a tolerant player decides to abstain, it effectively punishes
cooperators by not cooperating with them, and it also punishes defectors by denying them the possibility to
exploit a cooperative act. On the other hand, when a tolerant player decides to cooperate, if effectively rewards
the defectors by giving them an opportunity to exploit, and it also rewards other cooperators by supporting the
joint enterprise. The right balance between the two choices, it turns out, is subtle and difﬁcult to pinpoint, and as
such it favours a single tolerance level over amultitude of them. Yet, as we have shown, this does not preclude
diverse tolerance levels to constitute an optimal response to the public goods dilemma.
In addition to themore general observations related to the viability of tolerance and its evolutionary
advantages, the reported results reveal one of themost striking system-size effects. Namely, we have shown that
some globally stable subsystem solutions, and in particularly those thatmanifest synergies between different
tolerance levels, can remain completely invisible even at a relatively large system size. It is only when a sufﬁciently
large system size is used do these invisible solutions sometimes emerge as the victors of the evolutionary process.
And only if the system size is really very large does toﬁxation probability for these invisible solution tends to one.
This carries an important warning that is frequently overlookedwhen random initial conditions are used in
structured populationswhere competing strategies are three ormore. Although the usage of random initial
conditionsmay appear as themost ‘democratic’ setup, giving every strategy an equal opportunity to succeed, in
reality it is not the strategies that compete, but rather stable subsystem solutions. Subsystem solutions are
solutions that are formed by different subsets of all the competing strategies. In addition towhich strategies form
a particular subsystem solution, each such solution is characterised by a particular spatiotemporal dynamics that
supports its stability.Most importantly, some subsystem solutions therefore require longer than others to
emerge, or they require a larger system size than other, usually simpler subsystem solutions. Themore complex
subsystem solutions therefore often never even get a chance to compete against the faster emerging simpler
subsystem solutions. It is thus absolutely vital that the stability of subsystem solutions is veriﬁed for all possible
strategy combinations, and that the competition among the stable solutions is carried out so that all get a fair
chance, as demonstrated inﬁgure 3.
It is also important to note that the argument claiming that such demanding subsystem solutions are not
relevant because they simply require an unrealistically large system size is wrong.Once such solutions emerge,
they can remain stable also in very small populations. The large system size is initially needed simply to give a
chance to all possible subsystem solutions to fully emerge, and then for all of them to engage in a fair
evolutionary competition. In effect, the usage of a sufﬁciently large system size simply ensures that all imaginable
initial conditions will be realised before an accidental extinction, even if the latter is to occur only locally, would
prevent the emergence of a stable subsystem solution. But in reality, the realisation of a particular initial
condition, however special itmay be, ismainly amatter of time, and in case of intelligence also amatter of
craftsmanship towards initiating a particular change, rather than amatter of vast population size. Arguments
against solutions that are valid and remain stable in the large population size limit are futile, as they go against the
fundamental principles that have been established a long time ago in the realmof nonequilibrium statistical
physics and the theory of phase transitions [60, 61]. And it is of paramount importance for the research relying
on simulations of complex systems in biology, ecology, sociology, and economy to adhere to these fundamental
principles if it aspires to have anymerit.
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